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How High the Crime?
by
JOSEPH A. WOODS, JR.*

Before 1974, the concept and history of impeachment were
subjects well below the horizon, for me and for virtually everyone
else. I don't remember the words even being mentioned in law
school. But then the phone rang early that New Year's Day, and by
mid-January I was in Washington as a Senior Associate Special
Counsel to the House Committee on the Judiciary, responsible for a
staff task force examining constitutional and legal questions related to

the Committee's pending Impeachment Inquiry respecting President
Nixon.
Impeachment being a constitutional remedy, it seemed to me
that understanding it had best begin with the Constitution itself. My
children had given me a small, blue, paperbound booklet containing
the Constitution and the Declarationof Independence. That booklet
was in my pocket as I enplaned for Washington, and much of the
flight time was spent reading, rereading, and thinking about those
documents-time later proved to have been well spent.
Normally a congressional committee staff is highly partisan. To
ensure a fair and principled inquiry, Chairman Peter Rodino,
Ranking Minority Member Ed Hutchinson, Special Counsel John
Doar, and Minority Counsel Bert Jenner established an integrated
Inquiry Staff, separate from that handling regular Committee
business. Though individuals were selected by the respective parties,
each working group within the Inquiry Staff comprised both majority
and minority staff. We worked together on our assigned subject
matter-cooperatively, diligently, for the most part amicably, and, I
think, effectively.
The Committee and the Inquiry Staff realized that, if there were
to be impeachment and removal, the necessity and propriety of
removal had to be recognized clearly by the American people. That
* Of counsel, Donahue, Gallagher, Woods & Wood, LLP, Oakland, California.
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did not mean that unpopularity should be grounds for impeachment,
but it did mean that an election should not be upended on doubtful
evidence, or for reasons that the people could not readily accept as
serious and fundamental to the well-being of the nation.
The Committee recognized that discretion meant not only
judiciousness and fairness; it also meant confidentiality.
The
Members did a most unusual thing; they resolved that the work of the
Inquiry Staff should be known only to Chairman Rodino, Mr.
Hutchinson, and the Inquiry Staff, and that even other Members
themselves were to learn of it only at Executive Session hearings to
be held when the investigation was concluded. Staff contact with the
media was prohibited. To my knowledge, there were no leaks.
When we were attempting to define the proper grounds for
impeachment in early 1974, we were careful not to imply applicability
to the facts at hand. For one thing, our understanding of the evidence
was evolving, and judgment should not be premature. For another,
one readily gains a sense of place when working in the staff for the
House of Representatives. One could have his hair cut in the House
barbershop, but if a Member came in, one got out of the chair. One
did not reach conclusions, or even state facts. One could provide
information, or make suggestions, or in an extreme case offer a
recommendation, but certainly one could not decide.
Our effort was to be most circumspect in our choice of words.
The events following the Watergate break-in were not "a cover-up."
Instead, we had evidence-gathering teams addressing "Watergate and
its aftermath." (Incidentally, that fundamental research tool, L. M.
Boyd's Grab Bag column, told us recently that "aftermath" originally
meant "the second mowing of the hay." What would have been the
likely result of the Watergate burglary had there been a prompt and
open facing of the situation, and thus no occasion for a second
mowing of the hay?)
The observation is made, sometimes in a tone of surprise or
bemusement, and sometimes pejoratively, that impeachment is a
political process. This should not be news. Hamilton told us so in
The Federalist Number 65-and he told us in capital letters.' The
impeachment process originated and developed in the House of
Commons, not in the courts. It was most used in the Commons'
contest with Charles I over royal power. The Long Parliament
(1640-48) voted 98 impeachments. One could hardly get more
political than that.
That is not to suggest, however, that the exercise of such political
1. "They [impeachable offenses] are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the
society itself."
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power should be unprincipled.
Standards have evolved over
hundreds of years of English, British, and American history, and since
1386 those standards'2have been embodied in the phrase "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."
Precedent means something in impeachment that is markedly
different from what it means in our judicial system. There is no stare
decisis in impeachment. In that sense Gerald Ford was correct when
he said in the aborted 1970 investigation of Justice William 0.
Douglas that the grounds for impeachment are determined by
Congress at any given time.3 And, I might add, in response to any
given situation. The real question must always be whether, then and
there, the conduct complained of involves serious abuse of the powers
of the office or a serious threat to our system of government.
Precedent in impeachment is by way of example-how others
handled their particular situation in their particular time. It may or
may not be persuasive. It is not binding.
An early Inquiry Staff objective had to be informed analysis of
the grounds for impeachment. To be useful, this analysis had to be
grounded in sound scholarship. Even more important, it had to be
even-handed, a presentation of guiding principles that could be
applied by all Members to such facts as they might come to find
months later, after they had heard the direct testimony and crossexamination of the witnesses and reviewed the documentary
evidence. Our group relied on direct reference to the records of the
many English and British and few American impeachment cases; the
Constitution itself; the debates in the Constitutional Convention, the
ratifying conventions in the several colonies, and the First Congress
where many of the Framers served and sought to apply the
requirements of the Constitution they had just created; The Federalist
Papers and other contemporary writings; and the Declaration of
Independence, which we came to understand as the functional
equivalent of articles of impeachment against George the Third.
The result was published in February 1974 as Constitutional
Groundsfor PresidentialImpeachment,4 proposing that not all "high
2. Though parliamentary practice had a longer history, the phrase "high crimes and
misdemeanors" first appeared in the impeachment of Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk.
Suffolk was the King's Chancellor and was charged with many offenses against the state,
including failure to execute a parliamentary direction to ransom the town of Ghent,
resulting in the loss of that town. See ADAMS AND STEVENS, SELECr DOCuMENTS OF
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 148 (London 1927).
3. See 116 CONG. REc. 11,913 (daily ed. Apr. 15,1973) (statement of Rep. Ford).
4. See CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT, REPORT
BY THE STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 93D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, (U.S.G.P.O. No. 28959, February 1974) [hereinafter GROUNDS].
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Crimes and Misdemeanors" are crimes within the meaning of the
criminal law and that not all crimes are "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." '5 To be grounds for impeachment, the questioned
conduct, when considered as a whole in the context of the office held,
must be "seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form
and principles of our government or the proper performance of
constitutional duties of the presidential office."'6 The Committee
found that grave impact in recommending three articles of
impeachment.
The Constitution provides that the sole power to impeach is in
the House of Representatives. 7 The sole power to try impeachments
is in the Senate, and "when sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on
Oath or Affirmation."' 8 Upon conviction by the vote of two-thirds of
the Senators present, the charged officer is removed from office. 9 By
a separate vote the Senate may, but need not, disqualify the removed
officer from holding office thereafter. 10 There can be no penalty in
impeachment beyond removal and disqualification, but the charged
officer is "liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law."" The presidential pardon power
12 There is no judicial
does not extend to cases of impeachment.
13
review of impeachment proceedings.
The Constitution clearly states the grounds for impeachment:14
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'
"Other" means that treason and bribery are examples of "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors," not some discrete offenses. "High"
means significant, and comes to us from history. One does not find
the phrase in ordinary cases. It is peculiar to cases of impeachment.
When the phrase was suggested in our Constitutional Convention for
use in the Extradition Clause, it was rejected as "having a meaning
too limited," and the words "other crimes" were wisely substituted. 15
The Framers knew what the phrase had meant in development of the
Constitution in Britain, and it was that meaning they adopted, just as
they were rejecting Parliament's other major tool, the bill of
5. See id. at 26-27.
6. Id. at 27.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
9. See id.
10. See article I, section 3, clause 7, which provides for disqualification. The Senate
Rules provide for the voting procedure.
11. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
13. See U.S. v. Walter L. Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (1997).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
15. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 443 (M. Ferrand ed. 1911).
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attainder.
The prohibition of bills of attainder1 6 bears significantly on the
political nature of impeachment. An impeachment is a factually
based accusation of impropriety; a bill of attainder is a legislated
conviction, without an evidentiary predicate. If impeachment and
conviction proceed without a clear record of convincing evidence of
conduct amounting to high crimes and misdemeanors, there is a
critical blurring of the distinction between impeachment and the bill
of attainder expressly prohibited by our Constitution.
Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, was chief among the
advisors of Charles I. He was impeached in 1640 on charges of
subversion of "the Fundamental Laws and Government of the
Realms" and endeavoring "to introduce Arbitrary and Tyrannical
Government against Law.' 7 Even in the heat of the struggle over the
divine right of kings, the Commons, faced with a determined defense,
declined to bring the trial to a vote in the House of Lords. Instead,
the Commons adopted a bill of attainder against Strafford, thereby
avoiding the tiresome necessity of making their case. The difference
between impeachment and attainder could hardly be made more
clearly.
It is perhaps instructive that, when sitting as a court of
impeachment, Senators "shall be on Oath or Affirmation." So did
the Framers recognize the peculiar nature of a Senator's role in the
impeachment process. A clear distinction was thus made between the
normal legislative function and the essentially judicial function of a
trier of the law and the facts. The oath or affirmation requirement in
the trial of an impeachment is the constitutional counterpart of the
prohibition of attainder. It says to the senator that his or her vote is
to be determined by the facts and by the meaning of the applicable
standard-high crimes and misdemeanors-and not by partisan or
policy considerations. Whatever may occur in fact in a given instance,
what should happen is implicit in the oath or affirmation.
When our Constitution was being written and adopted, obviously
there were as yet no federal statutes, and thus no federal crimes.
There must have been some intended meaning of the Impeachment
Clause, and it seems to follow that the meaning was not limited to
crimes.
In Britain the potential consequences of conviction after
impeachment were varied and severe, including fines, imprisonment,
confiscation of property, and even death. In adopting the concept of
impeachment as a control over the conduct of public office, the
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
17. J. RUSHWORTH, The Tryal of Thomas Earl of Strafford, in 8 HISTORICAL
COLLECTIONS 8 (1686); GROUNDS, supra note 4, at 4-5.
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Framers chose a more limited effect-removal from office, and
possible disqualification from the holding of future office. And they
expressly provided that the subject conduct should remain amenable
to the ordinary processes of law, quite apart from impeachment, and
unaffected by it. This precise and targeted penalty helps to define the
type of conduct for which it is imposed: a political sanction, to be
imposed by a political process, for political offenses.
Thus, in 1974, the Judiciary Committee considered a proposed
Article based primarily on President Nixon's having filed false
income tax returns-affording an instructive parallel to charges of
falsity of President Clinton respecting his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky. The Committee rejected that charge by a substantial
bipartisan majority, with several Members stating clearly that the
Nixon taxes and related perjury were matters between a taxpayer and
power with which the
his government, not the abuse of presidential
18
impeachment process should be concerned.
In summary, not all crime is impeachable conduct and not all
impeachable conduct is crime. Impeachment and conviction of a
President reverse the will of the people, as expressed in a presidential
election, and thus should result only from grave abuse of the power of
office. The core question is whether the conduct in question perverts
our government or threatens our constitutional system. If it does not,
let the general criminal and civil law and the electoral process take
their course.

18. See IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 93D
CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305 (1974).

